A Reflection on the Ethics of Movement Lawyering by Carle, Susan & Cummings, Scott L
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
2018 
A Reflection on the Ethics of Movement Lawyering 
Susan Carle 
Scott L. Cummings 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Law and Race Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons 
A Reflection on the Ethics of Movement Lawyering
SusAN D. CARLE* AND SCOTT L. CUMMINGSt
ABSTRACT
This essay takes a new look at legal ethics issues alient to "movement law-
yers" who maintain a sustained commitment o social movement goals and col-
laborate with social movement organizations over time to achieve them. The
essay provides a historical overview of movement lawyering, tracing its develop-
ment to current practice in which movement lawyers work in collaboration with
mobilized social movement groups, though not always in traditional awyer-client
relationships. As this analysis reveals, contemporary movements employ a so-
phisticated array of strategies, which may pull lawyers away from traditional
representation paradigms. We argue that the legal ethics literature on movement
lawyering must adapt to these new developments. To advance this project, we
highlight two under-explored ethical dimensions of movement lawyering practice,
which we term intra-movement dissent and temporality.
The concept of intra-movement dissent spotlights the contested nature of
social movements and the need for lawyers to take sides in disputes over goals
and strategies. Conventional pplications of legal ethics rules do not provide
sufficient guidance to movement lawyers in such scenarios. Even lawyers who
are trying their best to be movement-centered will inevitably confront situations
in which they must exercise discretion without clear direction, such as in choos-
ing which groups to represent within movements and how to resolve internal
disagreements. The concept of temporality focuses attention on movement law-
yers' commitment o a long-term vision of social change. We suggest hat move-
ment lawyers should be able to identify long-term movement goals as their
primary loyalty and negotiate non-traditional relationships with specific clients
and other movement stakeholders to advance those goals. Our primary aim is to
highlight the need for more context-specific attention from scholars and practi-
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INTRODUCTION
In the lawyering and legal ethics literatures, scholars over the past decade
have begun to focus more attention on "movement lawyering."' This focus has
tracked activity on the ground as lawyers and activists motivated by social
movement goals have played prominent roles in the United States political and
legal system-symbolized by the legal mobilization against President Trump's
Muslim Travel Ban. There, lawyers responded to social media calls to action by
showing up at airports to help detained immigrants while filing lawsuits to block
implementation of Trump's executive order.2 As this suggests, lawyers associated
with contemporary social movements are responding to immediate political chal-
lenges, such as the upsurge in racial bigotry and religious intolerance, while also
learning how to interact with new movement organizations that use sophisticated
digital strategies as well as more traditional forms of grassroots mobilization.3
Within this environment, movement lawyering has generated scholarly and
practice-based interest as a potential model of legal activism that promotes strug-
gle by marginalized groups while avoiding problems of political overreach and
overmvestment in court-based reform.4 Much of the current scholarly interest in
movement lawyering focuses on its relation to progressive activism.' Yet
1. See, e.g., Amna Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
[hereinafter Akbar, Radical Imagination]; Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance
Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1879 (2007); Scott L. Cummings, Rethinking the Foundational Critiques
ofLawyers in Social Movements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (2017); Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement
Turn in Law, 43 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 360 (2018) [hereinafter Cummings, The Social Movement Turn]. For an
international perspective, see LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005); STONES OF HOPE: How AFRICAN
ACTIVISTS RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY (Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman
eds., 2011); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of Theorizing
Resistance, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397 (2003).
2. Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation's Airports After Trump's Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/lawyers-trump-muslim-ban-immigration.html [https://
perma.cc/2Y3C-UPKE].
3. The pivot toward digital strategies can be seen in the proliferation of movement hashtags, uch as: #noto-
nemore, #occupywallstreet, #metoo.
4. See Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 ILL. L. REV. 1645 (2017) [hereinafter Cummings,
Movement Lawyering].
5. See Cummings, The Social Movement Turn, supra note 1.
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movement lawyers today work to further ideological visions spanning the far left
to the far right, addressing a wide scope of specific issue areas.6 While fully aware
of this, we focus on lawyering in connection with progressive social movements,
which has drawn the most intense scholarly scrutiny.
Overall, progressive scholars and practitioners have reacted hopefully to the
emergence of what we argue is a distinctive model of movement lawyering. They
see this model as a means of deploying legal expertise to contribute to movement
success while minimizing risks to client autonomy and movement power that pre-
vious generations of scholars identified as sources of concern.7 Indeed, one of the
promises of the movement lawyering model lies in its potential resolution of
long-standing ethical concerns about lawyers whose pursuit of ideological com-
mitments over specific client interests creates tension with professional duties of
client loyalty. Despite this promise, however, little work has been done to explore
the professional choices movement lawyers confront in practice and how legal
ethics principles apply.
As movement lawyering aspires to collaborative client relationships in the pur-
suit of long-term reform, it plays out within a professional framework defined by
standard legal ethics principles. These principles are expressed in the American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which
6. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social Movements: An
Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do]. See also Radiolab Presents: More Perfect-The
Imperfect Plaintiffs, RADIOLAB (June 28, 2016), http://www.radiolab.org/story/more-perfect-plaintiffs/ [https://
perma.cc/6D7V-ZPMC] (describing how Edward Blum, a right-wing non-lawyer activist, engineered two key
civil rights cases before the U.S. Supreme Court in the span of several years).
7. See generally TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE
CIVI RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011) [hereinafter BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT]; SUSAN D. CARLE,
DEFINING THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 1880-1915 (2013) [hereinafter CARLE,
DEFINING THE STRUGGLE]; JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
(2005); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); Richard L. Abel, Contesting Legality in the United States after September 11, in
FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 361 (Terence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2007); Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a
Social Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61 (2011); Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in Community:
Representing "Colored Town", 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1829 (2007); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles,
Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); William N. Eskridge Jr., Some Effects of
Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062
(2002); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence ofLaw and Social
Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014); Gwendolyn M. Leachman, From Protest o Perry: How Litigation
Shaped the LGBT Movement's Agenda, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1667 (2014); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking
Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005); Michael McCann &
Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's "Allurements": A Relational Analysis ofSocial Movement Lawyers in the
United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV.
941 (2011); James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution ofFreedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997); Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006); Michael Waterstone et al., Disability Cause Lawyers, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1287 (2012).
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serve as the template for nearly all states' professional codes. The Model Rules
draw a clear line between lawyer and client objectives, and between lawyer and
client values. Rule 1.2 makes clear that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's deci-
sions concerning the objectives of the representation," and that such representa-
tion "does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic,
social or moral views or activities."' The rules further stress the importance of
single-minded attention to a client's immediate interests, prohibiting lawyers
from representing a client when such representation would be "materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to . . . a third person or by a personal interest of
the lawyer,"' and prohibiting current representation that poses a substantial risk
to the confidences of former clients without their consent."o Although the rules
exhort lawyers to engage in pro bono service and encourage participation in
legal services and law reform organizations," they give no guidance on how to
choose clients from within a social movement constituency with competing
interests. Nor do the rules address lawyers' duties in relation to the develop-
ment of legal principles and promotion of interests that may be realized only
far in the future.
Consider the following example. A lawyer commits herself to representing the
Movement for Black Lives (MBL), which is a specific organization that grew out
of the Black Lives Matter movement and has its own issue platform, emphasis,
and priorities.12 On referral from MBL, the lawyer agrees to handle an individual
client's police brutality case. As the litigation proceeds, the client begins to prefer
a large damages award whereas MBL would prefer prospective injunctive relief
to prevent such incidents in the future. MBL, for example, would prefer to obtain
an injunction that defines new police department policies on the use of force and
prohibits striking persons who are in restraints. The lawyer accordingly faces a
classic conflict of interest she must resolve. The movement lawyer's reason for
being in the case is to further the MBL's vision, even though her attention at the
time is devoted to a particular client's individual interests. Or, as is more likely,
she may have dual motivations: She wants both to help her client achieve his
objective of compensation for his injury and to further the interests and objectives
of MBL in preventing police violence in the future. What distinguishes her as a
movement lawyer is her commitment to MBL's vision of a better world achieved
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) & (b) (2016) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
9. MODEL RULES R. 1.7(a)(1). If a conflict exists, lawyers must decide whether they "will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client." MODEL RULES R. 1.7(b)(1). If the lawyer decides
she can provide representation, she must then discuss the situation with the affected clients, including the risk
of having to withdraw from the representation if an unresolvable conflict arises, and obtain the client's
informed consent before proceeding. MODEL RULES R. 1.7(b)(4).
10. MODEL RULES R. 1.9.
11. MODEL RULES R. 6.3 & 6.4.
12. See Akbar, Radical Imagination, supra note 1. On the Movement for Black Lives, see generally A
Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom & Justice, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES,
https://policy.m4bl.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ8T-GKD2] (last visited May 22,2018).
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through strategies for social change. Her orientation to practice involves more
than simply representing clients subject to police abuse. In this instance, the law-
yer, owing responsibilities both to the movement and to a particular client, finds
herself pulled toward two inconsistent objectives simultaneously.13 She faces a
choice between fighting for a higher damages award for her particular client and
for the stronger prospective injunctive relief the movement desires, but finds her-
self unable to successfully obtain both given limits the defendants have imposed.
This conflict is one of the hardest ethical issues movement lawyers confront yet
its appropriate resolution remains contested, underscoring the need for more sus-
tained inquiry on the ethics of movement lawyering.
Our essay offers a new perspective by focusing attention on the contemporary
practice of movement lawyering in order to highlight the particular ethical chal-
lenges it raises. We also provide some preliminary ideas about how these chal-
lenges might be resolved. In this sense, we seek to both deepen theoretical
understanding of movement lawyering and provide guidance to those who prac-
tice it. Toward this end, our essay advances three central aims.
First, we provide an overview of movement lawyering, offer a definition, and
assess its relation to familiar concepts of lawyering for social change that have
defined the so-called "post"-civil rights era. We argue that, although there is
much conceptual and practical overlap, the idea of movement lawyering as multi-
faceted legal advocacy in the service of mobilized social movement constituen-
cies presents a distinctive vision of legal practice that carries with it specific
ethical challenges.
Second, we introduce two concepts that fundamentally shape movement
lawyers' ethical choices and responsibilities: intra-movement dissent and tem-
porality. Intra-movement dissent draws attention to the inherent conflicts over
goals and strategies that define social movement struggle, which require that
lawyers have a principled mechanism for making representational choices in
the first instance and resolving internal disputes. Temporality is the idea that
movements work toward social impact over the long term, which requires that
lawyers have a process for planning and a commitment to implementation over
time, even in the face of short-term disagreement or setback. Both concepts, at
bottom, raise the specter of conflicts of interests-either between different
interests within a social movement or between short-term client interests and
long-term movement objectives. Neither concept is adequately addressed by
standard legal ethics principles and both have been overlooked in treatments of
movement lawyering.
Third, in light of the value of long-term social movements and the impossibil-
ity of neatly resolving conflicts within them, we suggest that lawyers have crucial
leadership roles to play in social movement campaigns beyond client-centered
counseling, and that standard ethics principles require revision to better facilitate
13. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 319 (1988).
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the positive contributions of lawyers who take sides on issues of social import
and dedicate themselves to the pursuit of long-term solutions. We conclude by
highlighting the need for more systematic scholarly inquiry on the ethics of
movement lawyering.
I. MOVEMENT LAWYERING: CONTINUITY AND DIFFERENCE
Understanding the emergence of "movement lawyering" as a professional cate-
gory, and assessing its distinctiveness, requires ituating it in relation to alternative
models of lawyering for social change, which have been much debated since the
advent of "public interest lawyering" in the 1970s.14 At a basic level, the project of
naming a distinctive approach to practice, like movement lawyering, requires
identifying something to define it against-an alternative mirror held up to reflect
what is different and unique about the new model. This definitional project always
raises questions about whether the new model is really new or rather repackages
old concepts and practices. In this part, we suggest that both perspectives are true.
Contemporary movement lawyering builds upon concepts and practices of the
past and also strives for new ways of thinking about and navigating the relation-
ship between law and social change.
We define movement lawyering as the use of integrated advocacy strategies,
inside and outside of formal lawmaking spaces, by lawyers who are accountable
to mobilized social movement groups to build the power of those groups to pro-
duce or oppose social change goals that they define." This definition draws upon
recent developments in legal practice and scholarship. Activist lawyering, on
both the political left and right, has been influenced by the rise of new social
movements and the resurgence of old ones in the new millennium. On the left,
prominent examples include the successful legal and political campaign to
achieve marriage equality, culminating in the Supreme Court's sweeping deci-
sion in Obergefell v. Hodges;1 6 the legal challenge to the detention of terrorism
suspects at Gu6intanamo as part of the so-called War on Terror;1 7 the contentious
campaign to win protected legal status for undocumented youth, called
Dreamers, during the Obama presidency against the backdrop of failed efforts to
secure comprehensive immigration reform;8 and the nationwide mobilization
against police violence, sparked by the killings of unarmed black men in
Ferguson, Missouri, Baltimore, Maryland, and elsewhere, fueling a broader
Black Lives Matter movement to challenge racial subordination through
14. See ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 58-78 (2013).
15. See Cummings, Movement Lawyering, supra note 4, at 1690.
16. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Obergefell at the Intersection of Civil Rights and Social Movements, 6 CALIF. L.
REV. CIR. 157, 163 (2017).
17. JESS BRAVIN, TERROR COURTS: ROUGH JUSTICE AT GUANTANAMO (2013).
18. Sameer M. Ashar, Movement Lawyering in the Fight for Immigrant Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 4 (2017)
[hereinafter Ashar, Movement Lawyering].
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criminalization and related debt collection practices.19 These efforts have been
matched, and in some cases surpassed, by conservative constituencies, ome
backed by powerful corporate patrons, which ave adopted the strategies and tac-
tics of their progressive counterparts to press for goals that oppose progressive
values.20 These conservative campaigns advance the causes of reducing taxes,21
opposing gun control,22 overturning Obamacare, undoing campaign finance
regulation,23 and promoting the free speech rights of white supremacists and
Christian extremists.24
Social science and legal scholars have documented and analyzed these social
movement developments, while seeking to draw normative lessons from them.
Sociologists have examined how law affects the opportunity structure for move-
ment action and how activists can use law as a tool to reshape social norms and
strengthen movement bargaining power.25 In the legal academy, scholars have
plunged deep into the theoretical and empirical literature on social movements to
explore how movement mobilization shapes lawyering activity and lays the
groundwork for legal transformation. In this "social movement turn,"26 legal
scholars have presented a decentered view of democratic reform, turning away
from earlier emphases on lawyers and courts in the vanguard of civil rights-era
change, and focusing instead on how social movements take the lead in changing
"hearts and minds"-forging a path along which lawyers and courts then
follow. 2
7
This scholarly focus on social movements generally and movement lawyering
in particular can be understood as a response to criticisms of the role of law and
19. See Akbar, Radical Imagination, supra note 1; Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to
Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125 (2017); Beth
A. Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson on Individual Defense Representation as a Tool of Systemic Reform, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1171 (2017). See also Elizabeth Day, #BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights
Movement, The GUARDIAN (July 19, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter-
birth-civil-rights-movement [https://perma.cc/MH9J-MN3W].
20. Kathleen M. Blee & Kimberly A. Creasap, Conservative and Right-Wing Movements, 36 ANN. REV.
Soc. 269, 271 (2010).
21. ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGNS TO UNTAX THE ONE
PERCENT (2013).
22. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 191 (2008).
23. See Ann Southworth, The Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in the Roberts Court: A
Research Agenda, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1221 (2015).
24. See Wade Goodwyn, Alt-Right, White Nationalist, Free Speech: The Far Rights' Language Explained,
NPR (June 4, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/04/531314097/alt-right-white-nationalist-free-speech-the-
far-rights-language-explained [https://perma.cc/Y4FA-TWBA].
25. See Chris Hilson, New Social Movements: The Role of Legal Opportunity, 9 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 238,
239-40 (2011); Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, ANN. REV. L. &
Soc. SCI. 17, 29-30 (2006).
26. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn, supra note 1.
27. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, Law, and Social
Change, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2133, 2144 (2007); Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6
CLINICAL L. REV. 427,440 (2000).
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lawyers in progressive social change.28 The concept of "public interest" lawyer-
ing, as it came to be defined during the 1970s, was associated with the practice of
representing clients, primarily in litigation, whose interests were underrepre-
sented in the legal and political system by virtue of their marginalized status.2 9
Public interest lawyering during this period was understood and undertaken as a
progressive project on behalf of racial justice, women's rights, environmental jus-
tice, and other causes. However, as success in the 1970s gave way to retrenchment
and reversal beginning in the 1980s-with lawyers confronted by more hostile
courts and the rise of a conservative public interest law counter-movement-
scholars articulated two central critiques that have cast a long shadow over pro-
gressive practice ever since.
One critique highlights how the asymmetrical power between public interest
lawyer and client-whether a vulnerable individual or diffuse class-enables
lawyers to pursue their own political vision over client interests, undermining the
core professional tenet of client accountability. Derrick Bell articulated this cri-
tique in a ground-breaking article in which he charged civil rights lawyers with
"serving two masters."3 0 Specifically, Bell argued that the lawyers for the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF), who handled the remedial
phases of school desegregation in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of
Education,3 1 skated close to violating their ethical duties to their clients. They did
so, in Bell's view, by pushing for the movement ideal of complete school integra-
tion over the desires of clients3 2-African American school children and parents
speaking on their behalf. These clients, Bell explained, preferred winning more
resources to improve their own local, still largely segregated, schools over being
transported to white schools in other parts of town. Agreeing with Justice
Harlan's position against the NAACP in an earlier case, Bell claimed that the "di-
vided allegiance" of lawyers employed by social movement organizations "has
developed in a far more idealistic and dangerous form,"33 and that lawyers work-
ing for idealistic motives, rather than pecuniary ones, needed the most ethical po-
licing. In Bell's words: "[i]dealism, though perhaps rarer than greed, is harder to
control."3 4
28. See Scott L. Cummings, The Puzzle ofSocial Movements in American Legal Theory, 64 UCLA L. REv.
1552, 1559 (2017) [hereinafter Cummings, Puzzle ofSocial Movements].
29. See generally BURTON A. WEISBROD ET. AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 28-29 (1978) (discussing classic definitions of public interest law and noting that at
bottom they involve representing under-represented interests).
30. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. Bell, supra note 30, at 512.
33. Id. at 505.
34. Id. at 504.
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In the scholarly dialogue Serving Two Masters spawned, some commentators
critiqued 1970s-style public interest lawyering as insufficiently self-reflective.35
Critics faulted lawyers (who were usually socially privileged, white, and male)
for dominating clients and client groups, substituting their own perspectives for
those of affected communities, and, in general, using their privilege in ways that
were in tension with the community empowerment goals of the movements they
purportedly served.36 Public interest lawyers lost sight of the appropriate line
between lawyer and leader, neglecting to ensure that they served as agents rather
than principals. In this regard, Bell and others portrayed public interest lawyers as
untethered from the interests of the vulnerable communities they claimed to rep-
resent-contending that lawyering had become yet another way of dominating
vulnerable communities through patronizing, know-it-all interventions.37 It was
in response to these concerns about accountability that scholars advocated a cli-
ent-centered approach, in which lawyers deferred to their clients' stated aims,
articulated after active dialogue and counseling.38
The second critique of public interest lawyering questioned the effectiveness
of litigation and adjudication in fundamentally altering entrenched structures of
social power. In this vein, critics suggested that the pursuit of law reform through
courts at best wasted resources and at worst harmed social movements by coopt-
ing their message and energy, and often producing backlash. Political scientist
Stuart Scheingold offered one of the most potent versions of what he termed the
"myth" of rights-based litigation strategies: "Without support of the real power
holders ... litigation is ineffectual and at times counterproductive. With that sup-
port, litigation is unnecessary. 39
Beginning in the 1990s, law and social science scholars developed two impor-
tant alternative concepts of activist lawyering that responded to these foundational
critiques. One response was to move away from the model of top-down litigation
associated with public interest lawyering toward a model of "community" or "col-
laborative" lawyering,40 in which lawyers engaged in "formal or informal collabo-
rations with client communities and community groups to identify and address
client community issues."41 Responding to concerns about lawyer accountabil-
ity, community lawyering embraced central principles of client-centeredness:
35. For a discussion of this critique, see Cummings, Puzzle of Social Movements, supra note 28.
36. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW
PRACTICE (1992).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Robert B. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIz. L.
REv. 501 (1990).
39. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE
130 (1974).
40. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027,
2064-77 (2008).
41. Karen Tokarz et al., Conversations on "Community Lawyering": The Newest (Oldest) Wave in Clinical
Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 359, 363 (2008).
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"enlisting the client in active problem solving, empowering the client to make
decisions, and taking account of legal and non-legal impacts of problems."42
Famous examples of this approach included Gerald L6pez's concept of
rebellious lawyering, which sought to mesh client and community autonomy
with bottom-up reform so that community members could become the agents
of their own change,43 and Lucie White's account of community-based legal
mobilization in South Africa challenging what she called the "third dimen-
sion" of power.44 Critics of community lawyering responded that by limiting
its scope to the community level, the model gave up on broad social change
goals for a "micropolitics" of client empowerment.45 William Simon's cri-
tique of the clinic-based, client-centered model provided another, far more
biting, call for redirection.4 6 Simon's argument was that lawyers necessarily
exercise power over clients, because legal representation involves numer-
ous opportunities for exercising discretion and professional judgment.4 7
Simon proposed that lawyers, recognizing this, should focus on cultivating
their professional judgment and sense of justice in exercising discretion in
this manner.4 8
The second alternative to public interest lawyering sought to avoid thorny
debates over the meaning of the "public interest" in order to spotlight what moti-
vated lawyers to engage in social change. The concept of "cause lawyering,"
introduced by Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, focused on the rejection of
professional neutrality in the pursuit of "something to believe in." 49 In this model,
the lawyers' social change objectives moved "from the margins to the center of
their professional lives,"5 0 as cause lawyers expressed "a determination to take
sides in political and moral struggle."5 1 The cause lawyer, in this view, was a
''moral activist" who shared "with her client responsibility for the ends" of the
representation.52 This framing divorced the model from any particular conception
42. CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 14, at 305.
43. L6PEZ, supra note 36.
44. Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lesson from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 699 (1988).
45. Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 L. & SoC'Y REV. 697, 724
(1992).
46. William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law
Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1100-01 (1994) (criticizing
clinical and poverty law scholars for misguided legal ethics analysis) [hereinafter Simon, Dark Secret].
47. Id.
48. See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LEGAL ETHICS (1998).
49. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM,
AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004).
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority, in
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
A. Scheingold eds., 1998).
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of the public good. At the same time, it recognized the inevitability of conflict
between the lawyer's commitment to cause and client. In this sense, cause law-
yering-premised on the lawyer's "thick identification" with social change
goals5 3-accepted departures from client-centeredness in the pursuit of broad-
based reform.
The contemporary movement lawyering concept builds upon, but is ultimately
distinct from, these concepts. As a matter of legal practice, activist lawyers have
long aligned themselves with social movement causes and sought to collabo-
rate with movements rather than run them. Lawyers have further sought to
advance social movement objectives through a wide variety of law-related
strategies, many of them not focused on litigation in high profile courts. In this
sense, contemporary movement lawyering represents le s a dramatic break
with the past than a reconceptualization of practice that emphasizes different
features of advocacy and distinctive aspects of lawyer relationships with cli-
ents and constituencies.
Movement lawyers in contemporary practice follow the leadership of grass-
roots actors in designing social movement campaigns, often using multiple legal
strategies consciously crafted to complement and advance political goals.5 4 The
new focus on social movements thus points toward an affirmative vision of law-
yering that seeks to promote popular mobilizations to change law and society
through "contentious politics,"" which alter the distribution of resources and the
balance of power within democracy. Recent accounts of movement lawyering
emphasize lawyer accountability to mobilized social movement organizations
that have the resources and political power to advance campaigns.56 In this con-
text, there is less concern about lawyers dominating vulnerable clients because
social movement groups are organized and sophisticated-able to assert power in
collaborations with lawyers.
Movement lawyers represent or collaborate with social movement organiza-
tions through collective processes of power mapping and campaign design in
which movement stakeholders identify targets, tactics, and goals. Movement
campaigns typically have multiple, interconnected purposes: achieving discrete
policy wins, building public support, strengthening grassroots participation, rein-
forcing the organizational capacity of the movement itself, and striving for last-
ing, long-term results.
53. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (2003).
54. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Rebellious Pedagogy and Practice, 23 CLINICAL L. REv. 5 (2016); Jim
Freeman, Supporting Social Justice Movements: A Brief Guide for Lawyers and Law Students, 12 HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 202 (2015); Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice Models for Social Justice
Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 25, 53 (2011); Alexi Nunn Freeman & Jim Freeman, It's About
Power, Not Policy: Movement Lawyeringfor Large-Scale Social Change, 23 CLINICAL L. REv. 147 (2016).
55. CHARLES TILLY & SIDNEY TARROW, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 4 (2006).
56. See, e.g., Ashar, Movement Lawyering, supra note 18; Cummings, Movement Lawyering, supra note 4.
57. Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in How DOES LAW MATTER? 83-
98 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
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In supporting movement campaigns, lawyers use an integrated advocacy
approach, in which litigation plays an important (though not central) role. For
example, litigation may be deployed for its indirect effects on political mobiliza-
tion and public opinion rather than as a tool to make change directly." Movement
lawyers also use a range of other skills: educating community members about their
rights, advising and defending protestors, researching and drafting policy lan-
guage, writing legal opinions to support policy positions, counseling movement
organizations on legal levers that may be pulled to exert pressure on policy makers
or private actors in negotiating contexts, and devising mechanisms for monitoring
the enforcement of policy. Historically, lawyers have always done all of this,
but the new movement lawyering vision brings this work to the fore. By expanding
the meaning of legal problem solving, movement lawyering recognizes the risks
of narrowly framed litigation to the overall effectiveness and durability of com-
plex social change efforts.
As an example of integrated advocacy, Nan Hunter's analysis of the drive for
marriage equality shows how LGBT rights lawyers deployed new "technologies
of advocacy," shifting away from a litigation-first model toward what she terms a
"campaign" model built around messaging through sophisticated media strategies
toward the goal of state-by-state same-sex marriage victories.59 The existence of
strong movement institutions-lobbying groups, think tanks, and communica-
tions firms-was key to the success of this approach.
Movement lawyers think of themselves as broadly accountable to social move-
ments, which are themselves represented by specific organizations and their lead-
ers. In this sense, movement lawyers maintain accountability to democratically
led organizations that claim to stand in for broader movement interests. At times,
these organizations are movement lawyer clients, while at others such organiza-
tions are simply part of the larger movement infrastructure that develops collec-
tive goals and strategies. The point is that there is engagement, formal and
informal, between movement lawyers and organizational leadership that shapes
what movement lawyers do.
Movement lawyering responds to critiques of the past by positing a more ac-
countable and effective model of mobilizing law for transformative social
change. Movement lawyers participate in the formulation and strategize about
the achievement of the causes they pursue, but their role is anchored in relation-
ships with extant social movement organizations that have ultimate decision-
making authority and legitimate claims to represent the interests of movement
58. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn, supra note 1. Social movements used litigation campaigns for
organization building well before the 1970s. See, e.g., CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE, supra note 7, at 5 (not-
ing that during the long historical stretches in which courts were hostile to social movement goals, activists did
not naively expect success from courts, but saw filing cases as a means of raising public awareness and mobiliz-
ing activism).
59. Nan D. Hunter, Varieties of Constitutional Experience: Democracy and the Marriage Equality
Campaign, 64 UCLA L. REv. 1662 (2017).
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constituencies.6 Although movement lawyers use the legal tools at hand to
advance movement causes, they do so in the context of a "participatory, power-
sharing process within the lawyer/client relationship," in which lawyers lend their
support to produce the "cultural shifts that make durable change possible."6 1
Lawyers do not simply defer to what non-lawyers think about social movement
goals and tactics-part of being a movement lawyer is having a stake and a view,
and providing leadership to advance the cause.6 2 Yet, in doing so, movement law-
yers engage with movement leadership in a collaborative fashion.63
This collaborative role, however, raises its own ethical challenges, which the
movement lawyering literature has not addressed. The rest of this essay focuses
on two important and under-explored ethical issues. First, social movements are
inevitably complex and conflictual.6 4 Movement lawyers are therefore constantly
confronted with the need to make representational choices in a context of intra-
movement dissent, in which social movement organizations divided on a host of
issues clash over goals and strategies. How movement lawyers choose to align
themselves within a contested social movement field focuses ethical attention on
the issue of accountability at the point of client selection and throughout cycles of
social movement contention. Second, because social movements are focused on
achieving a future state of affairs, with their scope of vision often extending very
far ahead of the present day, there is a crucial temporal dimension to movement
lawyering. How movement lawyers pursue goals over the long-term, navigate
trade-offs with short-term client interests, adapt in the face of setback, and con-
front counter-mobilization are core ethical challenges.
II. INTRA-MOVEMENT DISSENT: TAKING SIDES IN CONTESTED CAUSES
The first ethical challenge focuses on conflicts within the social movement
constituency lawyers seek to represent. Whom should lawyers represent within
"the movement"? Because social movements are internally contested, lawyers
who align themselves with social movements are necessarily forced to make deci-
sions to represent the interests of particular factions over others. Social move-
ments in American politics express very different ideas about how social change
could produce a better world, so there are many conflicting movement lawyering
60. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi, Mapping the Terrain, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 10 (discussing the key role of organizations in social movements).
61. Guinier & Torres, supra note 7, at 2753.
62. For instance, as Hunter reveals in the marriage equality movement, lawyers were essential strategists in
developing the public relations campaign that shifted the frame from preventing discrimination to promoting
love. See Hunter, supra note 59.
63. Kathleen M. Erskine & Judy Marblestone, The Movement Takes the Lead: The Role of Lawyers in the
Struggle for a Living Wage in Santa Monica, California, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 277
(Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
64. See generally DAVID S. MEYER, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA 130-32
(2007) (noting splits within social movement coalitions between more institutionally oriented and more radical
groups as movements gain greater access to policy making).
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visions.65 However, the point we highlight here is that even within a particular
social movement, there are conflicts over how to frame the ultimate movement
goals and which strategies to pursue. As Sameer Ashar describes in his analysis
of movement lawyering in the fight for immigrant rights, there was significant
conflict between mainstream and radical immigration groups over whether to
prioritize a stand-alone bill for Dreamers or pursue comprehensive immigra-
tion reform during the Obama administration.6 As this example suggests, intra-
movement conflict is the norm, with mainstream movement actors more inclined
toward incremental reform within existing democratic processes, while radicals
push for more fundamental restructuring outside of normal political channels,
and a host of other players take positions along multiple other axes.67 Movement
lawyers have to make representational choices in the context of these disagree-
ments and thus inevitably take sides in intra-movement debates over what ends
to pursue and the appropriate means for doing so.
The movement lawyering model seeks to address this problem by situating
lawyers in contexts in which other stakeholders influence their decisions about
whom to represent and how to do so, and then emphasizing advocacy for mobi-
lized clients that have the power and authority to hold lawyers to account. In
this way, movement lawyers seek to address conflicts in the social movement
context by representing clients that, in turn, legitimately represent the move-
ment's constituency. Lawyers do so by representing a movement organization
directly, representing an individual at the direction of a movement organization
(or coalition) to advance the movement's goals, or initiating a class action as
part of a strategy designed in conjunction with movement organizations. In
each case, lawyers are accountable to "a movement, not a class."68
Yet this framing of movement representation raises substantial questions at the
core of legal ethics, to which movement scholars have paid insufficient attention.
What does it mean to represent a movement? Who has organizational or individ-
ual standing to speak legitimately on a movement's behalf? How do lawyers
select among conflicting movement viewpoints about goals and strategies? And
what happens when there is only a weak or even non-existent movement infra-
structure?6 9 Taking these questions as a point of departure, the remainder of this
65. Compare ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE
COALITION (2008) (studying conservative movement lawyers) with L6PEZ, supra note 36 (presenting the com-
mitments of left-wing lawyers).
66. Ashar, Movement Lawyering, supra note 18.
67. See, e.g., BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT, supra note 7, at 190-91 (discussing conflict between
moderate NAACP lawyers and more radical lawyers representing the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee).
68. Guinier & Torres, supra note 7, at 2782.
69. See Martha R. Mahoney, "Democracy Begins at Home"-Notes from the Grassroots on Inequality,
Voters, and Lawyers, 63 MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2008) (detailing the role of lawyers in advancing the right to vote in
the absence of political participation and grassroots organization).
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part offers preliminary observations about the deeper accountability challenges
of movement lawyering and how scholars and practitioners might hink about
them going forward.
One observation relates to the exercise of ethical judgment by lawyers in their
representational choices-or the criteria by which movement lawyers make deci-
sions about client selection. Movement lawyers seek to advance movement goals
by representing clients that share or express those goals. Ideally, there would be a
collective process to determine and revise goals or, at least, an ongoing set of con-
versations between movement lawyers and organizational representatives that
would guide lawyer choices about which clients to represent and how.70
However, that is not always the case and the movement lawyering literature often
equates the lawyer's representation of particular movement organizations with
representation of the movement writ large. But this obscures important ethical
issues.
For one, the representation of organizational clients raises concerns about law-
yers preferring some group interests over others. Standard conflicts of interest
principles tend to treat organizational clients as a "black box."71 Commentators,
however, have shown how this standard conception may gloss over internal dis-
agreements in which more powerful organizational actors silence important dis-
72senting views.
In addition, no existing legal ethics principle holds movement lawyers ac-
countable for the choice of whom to represent in the first instance. Generally, a
lawyer's ethical discretion at the point of client selection is considered to be at its
apex. A lawyer can select a client for most any reason at all, subject to prohibi-
tions against discrimination.7 3 Although Model Rule 1.2 affirms that representa-
tion of a client does not mean that the lawyer necessarily espouses that client's
worldview or values,7 4 it of course does not prohibit a lawyer from choosing a
client precisely because that lawyer does in fact espouse the client's values or
political orientation. The question is whether that specific choice is made in a
principled fashion that adequately accounts for competing positions within
movements.
70. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, supra note 4, at 1658.
71. MODEL RULES R. 1.13.
72. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization
in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REv. 1103 (1999); Paul R. Tremblay,
Counseling Community Groups, 17 CLINICAL L. REv. 389 (2010). See also Ann Southworth, Collective
Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2449
(1999) (arguing that the Model Rules do not adequately address how lawyers should manage the issues of client
autonomy and conflicts of interests in representing groups).
73. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(g).
74. MODEL RULESR. 1.2(b).
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Movement lawyers intervene in complex environments, in which decision-
making is diffuse and contested. Sometimes work on behalf of coalitions may
give lawyers more claim to "represent the movement," yet coalitions com-
prised of multiple organizations with different levels of power and resources
can submerge internal schisms and sometimes may even give an air of legiti-
macy to groups that do not genuinely reflect the range of constituent interests.
Lawyers who work within coalitions, serving on leadership committees with-
out representing the coalition as a whole, may find themselves called on to
influence decision-making, yet have for guidance only their own values or
those of movement organizations with which the lawyers are most closely
aligned. Lawyers may be called upon to exercise their best judgment about
what a still-amorphous movement would regard as in its best interests. In these
scenarios, the "client" who should give the lawyer direction within client-
centering lawyering theory may be mute or non-existent.
The key point is, given the organizational diversity and conflict that defines
social movement environments, lawyers must make choices about which groups
to represent or which interests within complex organizations to support, and such
choices ultimately require taking sides. This picture of organizational and ethical
complexity challenges the common framing of movement lawyering, which
depicts social movements as having coherent interests they can communicate to
lawyers in determinate ways. Specific movement organizations may approach
lawyers with coherent interests, but this begs the question of which interests such
organizations advance and how representative the organizations are. Are there,
for example, marginalized constituencies within the social movement, as Tomiko
Brown-Nagin explores in depth in her study of civil rights lawyering in post-
Brown Atlanta?76 If So, what are the movement lawyers' responsibilities to notice
and rebalance inequities of organizational power? If marginalized constituencies
leave one social movement organization to form a rival group, what are the move-
ment lawyer's obligations to follow, challenge, ignore, or otherwise respond to
this development?77 What are movement lawyers' obligations to seek to keep
peace within social movement factions or, alternatively, to encourage debate
about and resolution of important points of contention?78
75. See, e.g., Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 46, at 1107 ("Poor people are not more likely than non-poor
people to have consensus about their interests.").
76. BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT, supra note 7, at 385-429 (discussing the work of welfare rights
mothers' leagues to redeem the promise of Brown v. Board of Education to improve educational opportunity
for poor children).
77. In one historical case study, the social movement organization's lawyer left the more conservative orga-
nization to help found a more radical one. See CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE, supra note 7, at 186-93 (dis-
cussing National Afro-American Council lawyer Frederick McGee's actions in proposing and then helping
found a more radical organization called the Niagara Movement).
78. See Ellmann, supra note 72, at 1151-52. In his important work on ethics issues in representing client
groups, Ellmann argues that lawyers should monitor the fairness of group decision-making processes and
"intervene on behalf of those becoming victims" if necessary. Id. at 1152. This helpful framework does not
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Because lawyers in social movements have to exercise judgment in choosing
sides in contentious intra-movement debates, it can be tempting to identify the
'movement lawyer" as the lawyer associated with movement interests with
which one feels most politically sympathetic. In this sense, labeling someone a
"movement lawyer," and casting others outside that category, may be more a
political judgment than a professional one. When scholars criticize lawyers for
lacking accountability to movements, they may actually be suggesting that
those lawyers have chosen to represent he wrong side in intra-movement
disputes.
One assumption of the movement lawyering model is the existence of mobi-
lized groups to hold lawyers to account. But what happens when a movement
lacks strong organizational capacity? In this context, one of the important exer-
cises of lawyer discretion is to support the formation of client groups in the first
instance-so that the lawyer has an entity toward which to be accountable. Such
client construction involves activities akin to community organizing, where law-
yers enter communities or approach members of constituencies the lawyers
believe should have a cause or claim to pursue in the interests of social justice.
This client construction can involve building organizations, recruiting members
for lawsuits, or some combination of both. Often individual cases and organiza-
tion-building synergistically interact. As history shows, there are many times
when, due to a lack of favorable conditions for political mobilization, legal advo-
cacy may precede-and help spark-social movement activism. While the
NAACP's Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall, for example, were
courageous movement lawyers by all accounts,79 their legal challenges to Plessy
did more to galvanize organizational development i  the racial justice movement
than respond to the instructions of a well-organized group.so They saw them-
selves as part of the leadership responsible for charting the movement rather than
as external agents responding to direction from it, and they were nothing if not
highly opinionated about how the movement should develop.s"
explain how the lawyer is to decide, other than through resort to her own ethical and political values, which
constituencies are victims and which are factions whose positions deserve to lose. Ellmann also discusses the
lawyer's potential role as mediator in intra-group disputes, again flagging this problem but not fully resolving
how it can be addressed from a client-centered perspective. Id. at 1155-56. See also id. at 1161-62 (discussing
whether lawyers should ask dissenting sub-groups to leave organizations while lawyers stay with the original
group); id. at 1158 (noting that lawyers must judge the impact of interventions they may make on group
autonomy).
79. See, e.g., GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE (2012) (documenting Marshall's bravery in representing
criminal defendants in towns in which he barely escaped lynching mobs); GENNA RAE MCNEIL,
GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1984) (arguing that
Houston developed a vision of social movement lawyering he hoped to pass on to future generations of
lawyers).
80. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (2005).
81. See id.
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More recently, lawyers used test case techniques in the campaign against anti-
sodomy laws, at times with little correlation to the situation of the real plaintiffs
involved.82 But in these cases, at least, lawyers found willing clients.83 Similar
questions are presented in situations researchers have documented in which
movement lawyers work in communities to create organizations that will then
advance legal and political claims. Professor Tony Alfieri's reflection on his
work with African American churches in Miami, Florida is a case in point. 84 His
article on Inner-City Antipoverty Campaigns focuses on how a lawyer is sup-
posed to decide when and how to become engaged in community struggle in the
first instance." How should movement lawyers go about deciding which com-
munities to enter, cast the pitch for building movement organizations, and select
campaign priorities? As Alfieri points out, deciding to intervene requires having
criteria governing when outsider legal-political interventions should be mounted
by lawyers who are not from affected communities and on what erms lawyers
should structure engagement and collaboration with local residents and represen-
tatives.86 He reviews a set of rules or judgments that lawyers have developed over
time about case selection and argues in favor of lawyers making long-term com-
mitments to specific neighborhood groups and staying faithful to those groups
even when their views conflict with other neighborhood representatives.87
In all of these contexts, lawyers following a movement-centered model will
work hard to stay in sync with the desires and articulated interests of the con-
stituencies they work with, just as community organizers do. Their success in
doing so comes not from standard ethical rules but from training in self-
reflection and prudence." Such training involves cultivating skills, which
may be first taught in law schools, in areas such as close listening, consulta-
tion, collaboration, mindfulness, fair-mindedness, and sensitivity to context
and nuance. All of these qualities are part of the ethical apparatus that move-
ment lawyers should bring to bear on their work.
III. TEMPORALITY: PURSUING LONG-TERM IMPACT
A second critical feature of movement lawyering practice is the relationship of
lawyers' work to time, or what we call temporality. In the standard legal ethics
82. See Dahlia Lithwick, Extreme Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of Lawrence v. Texas., NEW
YORKER (Mar. 12, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/extreme-makeover-dahlia-
lithwick [https://perma.cc/FT2R-6XB9]. See also DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012) (discussing lawyers' creation of a case narrative for the lawsuit that overturned anti-
sodomy laws).
83. See Lithwick, supra note 82.
84. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Education and Access to Justice in a Time ofScarcity: Notes
from the West Grove Trolley Garage Case, 2013 Wis. L. REV. 121 (2013).
85. Anthony V. Alfieri, Inner-City Antipoverty Campaigns, 64 UCLA L. REv. 1374 (2017).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 113, 124 n.37 (2000).
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framework, lawyers conceive of the fundamental point of their work as achieving
the discrete objectives of a specific client (whether individual or group), after
which time they terminate their representation of the client. To be sure, many
lawyers, both in the private and nonprofit sectors, represent repeat player clients
over time, helping them-in Marc Galanter's famous phrase-to "play for rules"
by strategically litigating some cases to judgment while settling others in order to
shape legal doctrine in favor of repeat player interests.89 However, standard legal
ethics analysis tends to treat these representations just like any other, in which
lawyers should defer to clients about the resolution of each discrete representa-
tion. This atemporal approach ignores the fact that such lawyers' work can pro-
foundly affect the future of law and society more broadly-often in completely
unanticipated ways.90 Although the Model Rules invite lawyers to consider the
impact of client work on others, including the court, third parties, and society as a
whole,91 they do not call on lawyers to consider what impact their work will have
on the world after their particular client representation ends, even though the
impact may often extend far longer than the defined endpoint of a matter. Indeed,
the one area in which the rules address long-term obligations of lawyers is confi-
dentiality-a duty to clients, rather than the public interest, that lasts forever.92
Other duties, such as client loyalty, terminate when the client representation
ends.93
Movement lawyering, in contrast, is fundamentally about mobilizing law to
change the direction of society far into the future-to achieve some vision of an
improved state of affairs in relation to which a particular client's legal matter rep-
resents a stepping stone. Movement lawyers typically see themselves as belong-
ing to the movement,94 contributing legal skills just as others provide non-legal
support.95 Put simply, the movement lawyer's central aim is to mobilize law to
cause future social change (or to stop it). Although the movement lawyer's efforts
may not bear fruit until a far distant point, the pursuit of future impact is the
motive force behind the movement lawyers' work-even if the precise vision of
that impact is blurry or contested.
89. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. &
Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).
90. See, e.g., DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR (1995) (tracing how advocacy by lawyers for
clients opposed to the labor movement ended up ushering in the New Deal and expanding labor rights.)
91. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 2.1.
92. See MODEL RULES R. 1.6.
93. See MODEL RULES 1.9 (discussing former client conflicts rules, which focus on preserving client
confidentiality).
94. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 443, 447-49 (1996).
95. For example, non-lawyer members of a movement may be organizing new chapters, leading rallies, lob-
bying policy makers and legislators, or raising funds through grassroots outreach or by writing foundation
grants. Still others may be writing newsletters or magazine articles, contacting press outlets, speaking to the
media, appearing at the meetings of organizations, or speaking at other events.
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In this pursuit of long-term impact, the movement lawyer chooses clients with
interests and goals that overlap with, but may not always be identical to, the inter-
ests and goals of the movement with which the lawyer is affiliated. The move-
ment lawyer's focus on future impact may motivate her to make short-term
decisions that are inconsistent with specific client interests in order to achieve the
long-term goal. For example, as highlighted in the Movement for Black Lives
example in the introduction, a lawyer may prefer injunctive relief favored by the
movement organization over her individual client's desire for a large damages
award.
Standard legal ethics analysis has treated this tension as a conflict between a
lawyer's commitment to cause and her obligations to a client's case.96 Even in
the classic test-case strategy, in which lawyers seek to carefully select cases to
build precedent over time, it is standard to view lawyers' ethical obligations as
running to the particular clients in the discrete precedent-building cases. This
conception of the lawyer's duty to short-term client interests in particular matters,
as opposed to long-term movement interests, is precisely what gives rise to the
conflicts concern captured by Bell's "serving two masters" critique discussed
earlier.
We would suggest, however, that legal ethics should permit movement lawyers
to count the long-term movement's interest as a legitimate goal to pursue. In this
regard, we suggest that long-term movement goals be treated akin to a consent-
able client conflict. Lawyers routinely address potential conflicts of interest
between two clients in initial retainer agreements. This is often done by specify-
ing a withdrawal procedure through which a "secondary" client gives informed
consent that, in the case of an unresolvable conflict with the lawyer's "primary"
client, the lawyer will withdraw from representing the secondary client. In the
context of movement lawyering, a movement lawyer should similarly be able to
agree to represent a specific client only to the extent that the client's interests
remain consistent with those of the broader movement constituency-which is
effectively the lawyer's "primary" client.
Surfacing this temporal dimension of movement lawyers' work provides a
counterweight to Bell's serving two masters critique. In the school desegregation
context, Bell argued that LDF lawyers should have taken seriously the wishes of
parents who advocated against integration and in favor of enhancing school qual-
ity in segregated communities-pursuing those parents' local objectives rather
than the NAACP's national objective of complete school integration.
But there is another way to look at this scenario. The lawyers involved were
also representing the wing of the civil rights movement, embodied in LDF, which
had fought for across-the-board school desegregation for at least a generation.
Lawyers whose primary loyalty was to the principles espoused by LDF would
have different obligations than those Bell assumed paramount: Their obligations
96. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 13, at 319.
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were to follow the ideals of the movement they represented. Through a long and
complex historical process involving generations of activism and accompanying
sacrifice, that movement had won hard-fought victories. As a result of this histori-
cal process, the organization with which the lawyers were affiliated stood for the
principle that equal citizenship on the basis of race could only be achieved
through complete student integration. From this perspective, accepting anything
less would have constituted a retreat to the discredited "separate but equal" doc-
trine and undermined the strength of other ongoing efforts to promote racial
equality in schools and other institutions. Why were the LDF lawyers who
handled the post-Brown remedial litigation not entitled to give voice to the collec-
tive effort that produced this view of what the post-Brown remedial plan should
be?
Many objections can be (and have been) raised about whether "the movement"-
or at least a particular leadership segment of it-made the right judgment
in choosing school integration over other approaches to improving the educa-
tion of African American students.97 However, our point here is not to weigh
in on that debate. Instead, we are suggesting that Bell was wrong to assume
that LDF lawyers were not ethically permitted to view school desegregation
as the proper goal they used as their ultimate guidance. To the contrary, we
believe that lawyers representing the long-term goals of a complex, multi-
decade movement would be justified in regarding those goals as primary.
Such lawyers should not be required to abandon those goals based on the dif-
ferent wishes of particular individual clients, especially when doing so would
undercut the lawyers' long-term efforts to build and defend legal precedent in
favor of a reform vision such as the challenge to the "separate but equal" doc-
trine. The lawyers Bell wrote about were members of an intergenerational
line of activists who had carried out the full school integration battle.98
Instead of abandoning their school integration goal, the LDF lawyers' appro-
priate recourse was to have withdrawn from representations where a parent
group wanted to pursue a course other than integration, using a standard con-
flicts analysis after having secured advance informed consent to this course
of action at the outset.99
From this perspective, one need not conclude that movement lawyers are
ethically required to place clients' interests ahead of long-term movement
interests. Lawyers who represent both an individual and a movement effec-
tively have dual clients, just as lawyers in standard lawyering arrangements of-
ten do. Movement lawyers should be entitled to handle that situation the same
97. The literature critiquing the lawyering strategies in Brown v. Board of Education is profuse. See, e.g.,
WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE
AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
98. Mark Tushnet traces the history of that battle in TUSHNET, supra note 80.
99. We recognize that in a desegregation suit brought as a class action, other options, like the creation of
subclasses with separate representation, might be possible.
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way that lawyers in standard arrangements would, by explaining to their
client that dual representation carries the risk that diverging interests may
arise even when interests seem convergent at the start of a representation. The
lawyer should lay out her planned course of action if irreconcilable conflicts of
interest arise between a client and a movement organization in the course of
the representation, such as between parent desires for local school resources
versus LDF's integration goal. This may require the lawyer to withdraw from
the client representation in the case. In Bell's scenario, for example, the LDF
lawyers could have explained to the parents in the remedial litigation cases
that the lawyers' goal was to work for school integration consistent with
LDF's instructions, and that parents should sign up for representation only if
that was the remedy they wanted too. If a divergence of goals arose as the liti-
gation proceeded, the LDF lawyers should have discussed this divergence
with the parents and figured out how to proceed. If they could not resolve
the conflict in goals, the LDF lawyers should have sought to withdraw from
representing the parents, in order to maintain their commitment to LDF's
long-term goal of school integration. These lawyers should have sought alter-
native counsel for the parents. If they could not find alternative counsel, their
ethical dilemma would become greater, as is always the case in "last lawyer
in town" scenarios. This situation illustrates the importance of obtaining
informed consent from clients at the outset, so that a foreseeable conflict
between client and movement goals does not arise as a surprise well into the
litigation.
In summary, when lawyers formulate long-term social change goals in con-
junction with other social movement actors, legal ethics analysis should give
more deference to lawyer decisions to prioritize long-term movement ends over
the short-term goals of an individual or group client, even though those move-
ment ends may be abstract or contested. Movement lawyers can do this by using
retainer agreements with future conflict procedure explanations imilar to those
commonly used in business practice and securing fully informed consent at the
outset from all of the clients in the case. As a matter of best practice, movement
lawyers should include a statement in their retainer agreements with individual or
group clients that explains the procedures they will use if an unresolvable conflict
arises, including the possibility that the lawyer will be required to withdraw from
representing the clients or, when there is a non-consentable conflict, from the
case altogether. What the lawyer cannot do, we agree in keeping with standard
ethics analysis, is to continue to represent a client in a conflict of interest situation
but steer that representation toward the movement's goals when the client objects.
The proper course of action in this situation is to withdraw from the client repre-
sentation or perhaps the entire case when appropriate.
Movement lawyering raises additional questions that future scholarship should
address. One set arises from the fact that some of the work that contemporary
movement lawyers do may not count as the practice of law. The blurring of the
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line between "practicing law" and other work that lawyers do has become an im-
portant topic in business law ethics analysis,0 0 but has not gained sufficient atten-
tion in the movement lawyering context. In one example that raises this issue,
movement collaborations may involve the use of contracts other than retainer
agreements, such as memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between a lawyer (or
group of lawyers) and leaders of movement organizations. The goal of an MOU
is to clarify that the parties do not intend to enter a lawyer-client relationship, but
rather to structure a different kind of relationship.
Where the MOU is designed to structure relationships among movement stake-
holders in strategic decision-making contexts that do not involve the traditional
practice of law, they are permissible devices to promote collaboration. Movement
organizational leaders and lawyers may choose to work together but not enter a
client-lawyer relationship for a host of legitimate reasons. For example, movement
leaders may choose to involve lawyers in a relationship that does not involve giv-
ing legal advice. The judgment the movement may be seeking from affiliated law-
yers may be political and strategic or relate to public relations, media, policy, or
legislative strategies. Generally, parties should be entitled to give life to their
informed choice to structure relationships with each other in these contexts with-
out invoking lawyer-client duties.
The topic of whether movement leaders and lawyers can imagine and give life
to relationships other than the traditional client-lawyer representation on which
the Model Rules focus brings to mind a chapter from David Luban's classic book,
Lawyers and Justice."o' In this chapter, Luban takes on the problem of movement
lawyers "manipulat[ing] their clients and put[ting] the interest of the cause above
those of the client" by handling cases to serve "the political theories of the law-
yers themselves."10 2
Accepting for the sake of argument that movement lawyers do, in fact, engage
in manipulation, Luban proceeds to defend such action as justified by the context
of the relationship.10 3 Key to Luban's defense is the idea that movement lawyers
are not acting as traditional lawyers when collaborating with other movement
actors in advancing a political cause. They are instead, in Luban's terms, acting
in "political comradeship."10 4 Just as actors in political contexts sometimes
engage in manipulating or deceiving their political comrades with respect to tacti-
cal matters-while remaining true to the deeper, shared political goals-Luban
100. See, e.g., Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First-Century Legal Profession, 63 DUKE L.J.
1243 (2014) (discussing the ways in which business lawyers increasingly do work that is not the practice of
law); Tanina Rostain, Legal Ethics: The Emergence of "Law Consultants," 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1397 (2006)
(examining the growing practice of lawyers in the business sector providing law "consultancies" rather than
legal representation).
101. LUBAN, supra note 13, at 317.
102. Id. at 317.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 325.
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argues so too may movement lawyers acting as political actors engage in acts of
client manipulation.' This is because, in political contexts, all the actors are
comrades rather than holding sharply divided roles of client versus lawyer. We
do not believe movement lawyers should ever "manipulate" clients (nor do we
believe Luban thinks this; rather, he is imagining an extreme scenario in order to
drive home his point). But the development of new forms of collaboration
between movement constituencies and movement lawyers, as we discussed
above, may now be giving reality on the ground to Luban's idea of "political
comradeship." Although he was interested in a different issue-whether the
movement ends justified the means lawyers used to pursue them-he highlights
the important point that movement lawyers operate in a political context that
requires rethinking ethical concepts that apply in standard legal representation.
We believe that idea usefully reframes movement lawyers' obligations in ways
that lend support to more flexible understandings of permissible relationships
between lawyers and other movement actors, such as agreements to collaborate
that do not involve traditional legal representation.
We have argued that focusing on the long-term scope of movement lawyers'
goals highlights the fact that movement lawyers' loyalty runs to a set of ideas or a
vision rather than to particular clients. But what happens when that vision is chal-
lenged or no longer appears politically viable? In this regard, part of Bell's cri-
tique was that lawyers had set an agenda that was no longer consistent with the
views of a significant segment of the constituency the lawyers claimed to repre-
sent. Were LDF lawyers acting within their ethical rights in following an agenda
that had been set through the work of prior generations of activists? Note that
here temporality reaches back in history as well as forward into the future: Do
movement lawyers have the ethical discretion to listen to the historical echo of
the voices of figures who set a movement on its path but are no longer around?
In this context, temporality is double-edged. It can, on the one hand, give cre-
dence to the ongoing implementation of long-term movement goals (i.e., integra-
tion in the classic post-Brown LDF example) or it can serve as an argument for
changing course in the face of changing conditions (i.e., resistance to busing, vio-
lence against school children, and judicial disinclination to remedy segregation
across district lines, in the same example). It is here that movement lawyers are
caught in the changing tide of internal movement politics, in which dissenting
views come to the fore and sometimes take hold in ways that change a move-
ment's course. We thus return to a key question: What should lawyers do when
that happens?
When possible, movement lawyers should be guided by the decision-making
processes movements adopt to develop-and also change-end goals. But these
105. Id. at 326-29, 337, 340.
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processes may sometimes be underdeveloped or unsteady.10 6 In these situations,
movement lawyers should do their best to take direction from a movement's cho-
sen leaders. Yet movement lawyers should also be attentive to issues or problems
in movement leadership structures that may duplicate patterns of domination in
the larger society, and should attend as well to the voices of those who may be
shut out of movement leadership. Rather than pretending to exercise no influence,
they should seek to use it prudently, as all lawyers aim to do when they serve cli-
ents in the role of "trusted counselor."1 0 7 Movement lawyers must strive to exer-
cise excellent judgment, one of the highest forms of specialized skill the best
lawyers develop through experience and training. From this perspective, there is
nothing inherently wrong with movement lawyers having a seat at the decision-
making table in relation to a social movement, provided that their perspectives are
added to, rather than considered to be superior to, those of others taking part in a
collaborative process (or "political comradeship," in Luban's terms).
In the same vein, movement lawyers should recognize the power and discretion
they exercise in a vast array of professional decisions, including how they frame
the issues in case representations or other matters in which they take part, and
which movement values, or interpretation of those values, they propound and fol-
low. In these respects, movement lawyers inevitably may be making ethical deci-
sions unconstrained by particular clients, because a movement lawyer's overall
career involves the exercise of ethical decision-making toward long-term goals.
In this pursuit, movement lawyers ally with some organizations representing sub-
movements or branches of movements but not others. They may create organiza-
tions or bring movement activities to communities that did not have them
before."os They may choose to represent some clients and pass over others. They
may become close to and have the ear of some leaders more than others. They
may translate movement goals into legal demands and in doing so inevitably alter
them to some extent.109
Focusing on long-term impact also spotlights the issue of what constitutes the
appropriate time frame for judging success. Because political struggles do not
have firm start or endpoints, and because each move within such struggles tends
to elicit responses by counter-movements, the temporal frame of impact assess-
ment is never obvious. How do movement lawyers decide when to start and stop
measuring social change in relation to a pre-defined goal? There is no obvious an-
swer in many cases. The choice of endpoints, which may be artificial, can affect
one's ultimate assessment. Legal mobilization does not occur in a neat and linear
fashion, and the time frame of analysis has important evaluative implications.
106. For a thoughtful analysis of the ethics issues that arise in representing inchoate groups, see Tremblay,
supra note 72.
107. See MODEL RULES preface (emphasizing the lawyer's importance as client counselor). See also MODEL
RULES R. 2.1 (noting the broad scope of the lawyer's role as advisor to the client).
108. See Alfieri, supra note 84.
109. See Akbar, Radical Imagination, supra note 1.
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Consider the movement for same-sex marriage. If one were to study the move-
ment before the mid-2000s, it would look much worse than it does now with the
success in Obergefell v. Hodges.11 o And apparent victories at one point in time
can slide backwards as well. Take the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
retrenchment in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder."'1 Or consider Roe v.
Wade,1 12 which had a positive short-term effect on access to abortion, though the
longer-term picture has been decidedly more mixed.113 Moreover, as time passes,
the number of other intervening variables that may have explanatory power for
why social change occurs increases-and thus evaluating a social movement's
impact becomes more difficult.
In staying committed to long-term social movement goals in a changing world,
movement lawyers must strive to be highly reflective about their work in repre-
senting a vision with which they identify and to which they have decided to
devote their efforts. In thinking about their role over the long haul, movement
lawyers are not violating their ethical duties. To the contrary, they are acknowl-
edging their context in order to guide their work in relation to core values of
respect for others, empathy, self-reflection, and "other-regarding" behavior114_
values at the heart of professionalism.1 5
CONCLUSION
This essay has sought to initiate a deeper conversation on the ethical issues
confronting today's movement lawyers. Toward that end, we have examined the
ethical context of movement lawyering-one shaped by long-term, repeat-play
dynamics, in which there is both significant intra-movement dissent and mobi-
lized opposition. From this perspective, we have offered a preliminary account of
the ethical challenges facing movement lawyers, spotlighting the fundamental
conflicts that shape movement lawyering from the point of client selection
through the pursuit of long-term causes. The goal of this effort has been to link
movement lawyering practice and scholarship with the field of legal ethics. We
hope to spark a more robust conversation in which specific ethical issues get
deeper analysis. We urge scholars to consider whether traditional ethics analysis
is always best suited to the type of legal practice in which movement lawyers
engage.
110. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
111. Shelby County, Alabamav. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
112. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
113. See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
114. An "other-regarding" orientation is an orientation that places emphasis on other persons' needs, either
in addition to or in lieu of one's own self-interest.
115. Indeed, many of these characteristics turn out to be salient in the developing ethics literature on law-
yers and leaders, which may also capture some of what we are striving towards in arguing for conceiving of
movement lawyers as engaged in relationships that are somewhat different from the typical client-driven,
lawyer-as-agent paradigm. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, LAWYERS As LEADERS (2013).
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Although our effort has been preliminary, it has produced a set of starting points
for future reflection. We have suggested, first, that movement lawyering, while
building on old foundations, aspires to a new practice ideal defined by integrated
advocacy for mobilized clients. This aspiration, we have argued, carries forward
ethical tensions that need fuller exploration. Such exploration implicates the long-
standing debate within legal ethics about whether rules of professional conduct
should aspire to unify the profession-binding everyone to the same standards of
conduct in order to promote uniform behavior and professional cohesion-or
whether the application of the rules should be more context-specific, recognizing
that specific forms of practice may raise different ethics concerns.116
Our view is that movement lawyering should not be shoehorned into stand-
ard ethical paradigms. Instead, scholars should help define appropriate legal
ethics principles tailored to this practice context. Those principles should not
be completely subsumed under the principles that guide standard lawyering
arrangements.1 17 Standard principles provide a starting point that should apply
in important respects, such as on matters involving integrity, honesty, and fair-
ness to third parties. Yet in other respects, standard ethics rules may be ill-
suited to the important values movement lawyering pursues.
As we have argued, standard ethics gives insufficient guidance to how lawyers
should think about selecting social movement clients and engaging with organi-
zational leaders in contexts of intra-movement dissent. Movement lawyers may
be required to act without clear client direction when they first begin to mobilize
a community or organize a new group, as well as when constituencies they repre-
sent do not have strong procedures in place to provide for giving instructions or
making decisions. These scenarios call on movement lawyers to engage in ethical
considerations that are not well articulated in traditional legal ethics rules.
In addition, we have questioned the standard view that movement lawyers
must always prioritize specific clients' short-term interests over a movement's
long-term goal-a principle that would leave the long-term goal without effective
representation. Instead, movement lawyers should be permitted to assert their pri-
mary loyalty to the representation of the movement goal, at the same time that
they wish to represent individual or organizational clients. Under this practice
arrangement, movement lawyers must ensure informed consent and authentic
collaboration by affected clients.
116. Cf. Susan D. Carle, The Settlement Problem in Public Interest Law, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 40
(2018) (arguing that ethics problems raised by settlement in public interest cases differ in some regards from
those in cases in which clients are paying lawyers for their services); Susan D. Carle, Power as a Factor in
Lawyers' Ethical Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 115, 135-36 (2006) (arguing that ethics concerns for law-
yers who represent clients with little power are different from those for lawyers who represent clients with great
power).
117. For a classic discussion of the importance of recognizing that practice contexts may alter legal ethics
considerations, see David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468, 511 (1990).
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We have suggested that in pursuing authentic ollaboration, movement law-
yers must strike a fine balance between norms of deference and the exercise of
leadership. Movement lawyers should carefully listen to and consider the views
of individuals and groups who will be affected by movement lawyering work.
And movement lawyers should be humble and sensitive to the dangers of abusing
their professional status. Yet at the same time, lawyers have important contribu-
tions to add to movement design and execution. Toward that end, lawyers should
offer their skills and expertise to movements in such a way as to achieve the most
effective results possible. They should, in short, aspire to work in partnership
with other movement stakeholders-those in the lead and those on the ground-
dedicating themselves to helping advance movements to win democratically ac-
countable change over time.
